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Abstract
In this paper, we investigate secure transmission in a massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) system
adopting low-resolution digital-to-analog converters (DACs). Artificial noise (AN) is deliberately transmitted
simultaneously with the confidential signals to degrade the eavesdropper’s channel quality. By applying the
Bussgang theorem, a DAC quantization model is developed which facilitates the analysis of the asymptotic
achievable secrecy rate. Interestingly, for a fixed power allocation factor φ, low-resolution DACs typically result
in a secrecy rate loss, but in certain cases they provide superior performance, e.g., at low signal-to-noise ratio
(SNR). Specifically, we derive a closed-form SNR threshold which determines whether low-resolution or high-
resolution DACs are preferable for improving the secrecy rate. Furthermore, a closed-form expression for the
optimal φ is derived. With AN generated in the null-space of the user channel and the optimal φ, low-resolution
DACs inevitably cause secrecy rate loss. On the other hand, for random AN with the optimal φ, the secrecy rate is
hardly affected by the DAC resolution because the negative impact of the quantization noise can be compensated
for by reducing the AN power. All the derived analytical results are verified by numerical simulations.
Index Terms
Physical layer security, massive multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO), digital-to-analog converter (DAC),
artificial noise (AN)
I. INTRODUCTION
Secrecy plays an important role in wireless communications since it is difficult for a broadcast channel
to shield transmit signals from unintended recipients. Traditionally, secure transmission relies on key-
2based cryptographic methods implemented at the network and application layers [1]. However, these
cryptographic measures are based on the assumption that it is computationally infeasible for the encrypted
message to be deciphered within a reasonable amount of time. Consequently, they inevitably become
more vulnerable as the computational capability of the adversary grows. In the past decade, physical
layer security, as a complement to existing cryptographic methods, has gained increasing attention [2]-
[4]. With appropriate designs, physical layer techniques enable secure communication over a wireless
medium without the help of encryption keys [5]-[7]. In addition, they can be used to augment already
existing security measures at higher layers, leading to a multilayer secure transmission [8].
The classical three-terminal security model, known as the wiretap channel, was originally proposed in
[9], consisting of a transmitter (Alice), an intended receiver (Bob), and an unauthorized receiver (Eve)
referred to as an eavesdropper. This concept has been extended to multi-antenna networks [10], [11],
while beamforming techniques have been utilized in multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO) systems to
improve secrecy [12]. When the instantaneous channel state information (CSI) of the eavesdropper is
known at the transmitter, it has been demonstrated in [13] that the generalized singular value decomposi-
tion (GSVD) precoding scheme can achieve the secrecy capacity in the high signal-to-noise ratio (SNR)
limit. The study in [14] showed that secret communication is possible if the eavesdropper’s channel is
more noisy than the user channel. When the eavesdropper happens to have a better channel than the
legitimate user (e.g., if the eavesdropper is much closer to the transmitter), artificial noise (AN) has
been proposed in [15] and [16] to help degrade the channel quality of the eavesdropper. The AN is
usually designed to be orthogonal to the channel of the intended receivers, thus causing no additional
interference to the legitimate users [17], [18]. In order to further combat the uncertainty of channel
information at the transmitter, robust beamforming design for physical layer security with the aid of AN
has been studied in [19].
Recently, massive MIMO has become a candidate technology for next-generation wireless communi-
cation systems [20]-[23] and its application to guarantee communication security has attracted significant
attention. In massive MIMO, hundreds, or even thousands, of antennas are equipped at the base station
(BS) [24]-[26] and the corresponding spatial-wideband effect has been studied in [27]. For instance,
downlink secure transmission at the physical layer in a multi-cell MIMO network has been investigated
in [28] and the impact of a massive MIMO relay on secrecy has been studied in [29]. The authors
in [30] have derived two tight lower bounds for the ergodic secrecy rate considering a maximal-ratio-
combining (MRC) precoder. In order to strike a balance between complexity and performance, linear
3precoders based on matrix polynomials have been proposed in [31] and a phase-only zero-forcing (ZF)
AN scheme has been presented in [32]. The authors in [33] proposed a pilot-based channel training
scheme for a full-duplex receiver to enhance the physical layer security. As demonstrated in [34], AN
can also be injected into the downlink training signals to prevent the eavesdropper from obtaining
accurate CSI for the eavesdropping link.
Despite the promising performance gain brought by massive MIMO, it suffers from a challenging
issue of high cost and power consumption due to the fact that each antenna requires a separate radio-
frequency (RF) chain for signal processing. One potential approach to reducing the required cost and
power is to use digital-to-analog converters (DACs) with lower resolution for downlink transmissions
[35]. A number of authors have considered various direct nonlinear precoding schemes that constrain
the transmit signals to match the DAC resolution. For example, a novel precoding technique using 1-bit
DACs has been presented in [36] and a nonlinear beamforming algorithm has been proposed in [37].
Also, perturbation methods minimizing the probability of error at the receivers have been studied in [38].
An alternative simpler approach is to quantize the output of standard linear precoders, which is referred
to as quantized linear precoding [39]-[41]. Although it is generally difficult to analytically characterize
the performance degradation due to nonlinear quantization, the well-known Bussgang theorem can be
applied to develop an approximate linear model [42], [43] . This model decomposes the quantized
signal into a linearly distorted version of the signal together with an uncorrelated quantization noise
source [44]. It is noteworthy that the DAC quantization noise shares some similarities with the AN
injected by the BS as both are transmitted along with the information-carrying signals and produce
interference at the eavesdropper. In other words, the DAC quantization noise can be regarded, in some
sense, as a special type of AN. Hence, it can also decrease the received signal-to-interference-and-noise
ratio (SINR) at the eavesdropper, while unavoidably interfering with legitimate users at the same time.
While common sense dictates that low-resolution DAC quantization degrades system performance in
conventional massive MIMO systems, it is interesting to consider the possibility that DAC quantization
could enhance secrecy capacity in some scenarios. To the best of our knowledge, only few of the
existing works (e.g., [9]-[19], [28]-[34]) have investigated secure massive MIMO communications using
low-resolution DACs.
On the other hand, although the effect of hardware impairments on secure massive MIMO systems
has been analyzed in [45], only ideal converters with infinite resolution were considered. In this paper,
we investigate secure transmission in a multiuser massive MIMO downlink network equipped with low-
4resolution DACs at the BS. We assume that there exists a multi-antenna eavesdropper that intends to
eavesdrop the information transmitted from the BS to multiple legitimate users. The eavesdropper is
passive in order to conceal its presence. We assume for simplicity that perfect CSI is available at the
BS since there are already a number of studies, i.e., [46]-[49], focusing on the problem of channel
estimation. We consider two popular AN methods for injecting AN at the BS in order to prevent the
unintended receiver from eavesdropping. One method is based on AN which lies in the null-space
spanned by the channels of all the desired users, while the other assumes random AN. We also study
the impact of low-resolution DACs on the achievable secrecy rate. The main contributions of this work
are summarized as follows:
1) For the case of low-resolution DAC quantization in secure massive MIMO, we derive tight lower
bounds for the secrecy rate of the system using different types of AN methods. We observe that lower-
resolution DACs provide superior secrecy performance under certain circumstances, e.g., at low SNR.
This is explained by the fact that the quantization noise degrades the eavesdropper’s capacity more
significantly than that of the users. Specifically, we derive a closed-from expression for a threshold SNR
γ¯0, such that if the transmit SNR γ0 satisfies γ0 < γ¯0, lower-resolution DACs enhance the secrecy rate,
while if γ0 > γ¯0, higher-resolution DACs are preferred.
2) It is found that secure transmission with low-resolution DACs depends heavily on the power
allocation factor φ ∈ (0, 1], which denotes the proportion of power used for confidential signals, with
the remainder of the power allocated for AN. Generally, the secrecy rate first increases with φ but then
subsequently decreases. A closed-form expression for an approximate optimal φ∗ is obtained. We observe
that φ∗ increases with a decreasing DAC resolution. This suggests that less power can be utilized to
generate AN for DACs with a lower resolution.
3) For the null-space AN method with the optimal φ∗, we observe that low-resolution DACs lead to
secrecy rate loss for all SNR values. On the other hand, for the random AN method, the secrecy rate
with φ∗ is insensitive to the DAC resolution. This is because the DAC quantization noise behaves the
same as random AN at both the intended user and eavesdropper. As the quantization noise increases,
we can maintain the same secrecy rate by reducing the power of the random AN with an increasing φ.
4) If extremely low-resolution DACs, i.e., 1-bit DACs, are employed at the BS, the advantage of null-
space AN over random AN becomes marginal, while the null-space AN also suffers from a much higher
computational complexity especially in massive MIMO. In this scenario, the null-space AN method is
not cost-efficient and random AN is preferred.
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Fig. 1. Block diagram of the secure multiuser massive MIMO system.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. The DAC quantization model, channel model, and two
AN design methods are introduced in Section II. We derive a tight lower bound for the achievable secrecy
rate in Section III assuming low-resolution DACs. Section IV analyzes the effect of various system
parameters on secure communication. Simulation results are presented in Section V, and conclusions are
drawn in Section VI.
Notation: AT , A∗, and AH represent the transpose, conjugate, and conjugate transpose of A, re-
spectively. a ∼ CN (0,Σ) denotes a circularly symmetric complex Gaussian vector with zero mean
and covariance matrix Σ. tr{A} denotes the trace of A and diag(A) is a matrix that retains only the
diagonal entries of A. E{·} is the expectation operator. ‖·‖2 denotes the Euclidean norm. a.s.−−→ denotes
almost sure convergence. [x]+ = max{0, x} chooses the maximum between 0 and x.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
In this section, we investigate a multiuser massive MIMO security network employing low-resolution
DACs. The DAC quantization model and two AN design methods are introduced.
A. Quantization Model for Low-resolution DACs
It is in general difficult to accurately characterize the quantization error of an arbitrary low-resolution
DAC. Fortunately, an equivalent linear representation has been widely adopted by using the Bussgang
6theorem [42]. This model has been verified to be accurate enough for most DAC quantization levels in
practice [50]. In this model, the quantized data is decomposed into two uncorrelated parts as
QDA(x) = Fx + nDA, (1)
where QDA(·) denotes the quantization operation, x denotes the input data vector to the DAC, F
represents the equivalent linear transformation matrix, and nDA ∼ CN (0,CDA) denotes the Gaussian
quantization noise. It was shown in [50] that
F =
√
1− ρ I, (2)
and
CDA = ρ E
{
diag
(
xxH
)}
, (3)
where ρ ∈ (0, 1) is a distortion factor that depends on the DAC resolution bDA, which represents the
number of quantized bits for the DAC.
B. Secure Massive MIMO Transmission
In the considered massive MIMO downlink network as illustrated in Fig. 1, K single-antenna users
are served by an N-antenna BS, where each transmit antenna employs a pair of low-resolution DACs
for processing the in-phase and quadrature signals. Meanwhile, a passive eavesdropper equipped withM
antennas strives to eavesdrop the information sent to the users. In order to protect the confidential data
from eavesdropping, the BS injects AN into the information-bearing signals. Before transmission, the
signal vector s ∈ CK×1 with E{ssH} = IK is precoded by a matrix W ∈ CN×K with tr{WWH} = K,
while the AN vector z ∼ CN (0, IN−K) is multiplied by an AN shaping matrix V ∈ CN×(N−K) with
tr{VVH} = N −K. The weighted data vector at the BS before transmission is expressed as
x =
√
φP
K
Ws+
√
(1− φ)P
N −K Vz ,
√
pWs+
√
qVz, (4)
where P denotes the total transmit power and φ ∈ (0, 1] is a power allocation factor. For notational
simplicity, we define
p ,
φP
K
(5)
7and
q ,
(1− φ)P
N −K . (6)
Applying the quantization model in (1), the transmit vector after DAC quantization is given by
xq = QDA(x) =
√
1− ρ x+ nDA, (7)
where nDA ∼ CN (0,CDA) represents the quantization noise which is uncorrelated with x. By substi-
tuting (4) into (3), the quantization noise covariance matrix CDA is obtained as
CDA = ρ
[
p diag
(
WWH
)
+ q diag
(
VVH
) ]
. (8)
Then, from (4) and (7), the received vector at the K users can be expressed as
y = Hxq + n =
√
1− ρ
(√
pHWs+
√
qHVz
)
+HnDA + n, (9)
where n ∼ CN (0, σ2nIK) represents the thermal additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) at the users,
and H ∈ CK×N denotes the channel matrix between the BS and K users. In this work, we assume that
long-term power control is employed to compensate for the large-scale fading of the different users.
Furthermore, the entries of H are modeled as independent and identically distributed (i.i.d.) complex
Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance. Similarly, the received vector at the
eavesdropper is
ye = Hexq + ne =
√
1− ρ
(√
pHeWs+
√
qHeVz
)
+HenDA + ne, (10)
where ne ∼ CN (0, σ2eIM) represents the thermal AWGN at the eavesdropper, and He ∈ CM×N denotes
the channel matrix between the BS and the eavesdropper, whose entries are also modeled as i.i.d. complex
Gaussian random variables with zero mean and unit variance. To guarantee secure communication in
the worst case, we assume that σ2e is sufficiently small at the eavesdropper and can be ignored in the
sequel [16], [30], [31].
C. AN Design Methods
In this paper, we consider two common methods to generate the AN shaping matrix V. Let vi, ∀ i ∈
{1, 2, ..., N −K}, denote the ith column of V satisfying the constraint ‖vi‖2=1.
81) Null-Space Artificial Noise: For downlink data transmission, AN is added to the transmit signals
at the BS to degrade the decoding ability of the eavesdropper. However, it can simultaneously interfere
with the legitimate users as well. In order to avoid any potential leakage of the AN to the intended
users, the AN is often designed to lie in the null-space of the channel matrix H, i.e., HV = 0, assuming
H is available at the transmitter. However, taking low-resolution DACs into account, the AN no longer
perfectly lies in the channel null-space after quantization and thus additional interference still exists.
2) Random Artificial Noise: For massive MIMO communication, the computational complexity of the
null-space of H becomes prohibitively large with a large dimension N . Therefore, a much simpler but
effective method to design V was introduced in [30]. In this method, the columns of V are generated
as mutually independent random vectors satisfying ‖vi‖2 = 1, ∀ i ∈ {1, 2, ..., N −K}. The random AN
is inevitably leaked to the intended users but it offers much lower computational complexity compared
to the null-space based AN.
Note that for both AN design methods, the columns of V asymptotically form an incomplete orthog-
onal basis with large N due to the strong law of large numbers [30]. In the following, we refer to the
above two AN design methods by using superscripts, N and R, respectively.
III. ACHIEVABLE ERGODIC SECRECY RATE
Given the expressions of the received signals at both the users and eavesdropper, we derive the
achievable secrecy rate per user in this section, under the assumption of large numbers of antennas and
users but with fixed ratios given as:
α ,
M
N
(11)
and
β ,
K
N
, (12)
where β denotes the user loading ratio [44]. To start, we first recall the following lemma from [30,
Lemma 1].
Lemma 1. The achievable ergodic secrecy rate for the kth user is given by
Rsec,k = [Rk − Ck]+, (13)
9where [x]+ = max{0, x}, Rk represents the achievable ergodic rate of the kth user, and Ck denotes
the ergodic capacity between the BS and the eavesdropper seeking to decode the information of the kth
user.
In the following, we derive a lower bound for Rk and an upper bound for Ck assuming low-resolution
DACs, which then provides us a lower bound for the achievable ergodic secrecy rate.
A. Achievable Ergodic Rate of Each User
From (9), the received signal of user k, i.e., yk, can be expressed as
yk =
√
1− ρ (√phTkWs+√qhTkVz)+ hTknDA + nk, (14)
where hTk denotes the kth row ofH and nk is the kth element of n. We also expressW = [w1,w2, ...,wk]
where wk ∈ CN×1, ∀k ∈ {1, 2, ..., K}, is the kth column of W. Then, the signal-to-interference-
quantization-and-noise ratio (SIQNR) of the kth user, γk, can be expressed as
γk =
Sk︷ ︸︸ ︷
(1− ρ)p|hTkwk|2
(1−ρ)p
∑
j 6=k
|hTkwj |2︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ik
+hTkCDAh
∗
k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Qk
+(1−ρ)qhTkVVHh∗k︸ ︷︷ ︸
Ak
+σ2n
, (15)
where Sk is the power of the desired signal and Ik represents the power of the inter-user interference.
Variables Qk and Ak denote the interference power caused by DAC quantization and AN, respectively.
Then, by imposing the worst-case assumption of Gaussian distributed interference and applying Shan-
non’s formula, a lower bound for the achievable ergodic rate of user k can be evaluated as
Rk = E
{
log2 (1 + γk)
}
. (16)
In order to characterize the user rate performance, we derive the asymptotic behavior of γk with both
AN and DAC quantization in the following lemma.
Lemma 2. Under the assumption of N →∞ with fixed α and β, the SIQNR of each user almost surely
converges to
γNk
a.s.−−→
(1− ρ)
(
1
β
− 1
)
φγ0
ργ0 + 1
, γN , (17)
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for null-space AN and
γRk
a.s.−−→
(1− ρ)
(
1
β
− 1
)
φγ0
ργ0 + (1− ρ)(1− φ)γ0 + 1 , γ
R, (18)
for random AN, where γ0 =
P
σ2n
represents the average transmit SNR.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Since convergence is preserved for continuous functions according to the Continuous Mapping The-
orem [51], we apply Lemma 2 to (16) and thus the asymptotic achievable rates of each user for both
the AN design methods are respectively obtained as
RN = log2

1 + (1− ρ)
(
1
β
− 1
)
φγ0
ργ0 + 1

 (19)
and
RR = log2

1 + (1− ρ)
(
1
β
− 1
)
φγ0
ργ0 + (1− ρ)(1− φ)γ0 + 1

 . (20)
From (19) and (20), it can be observed that both RN and RR increase with decreasing β, which implies
that the achievable rate increases with more BS antennas or fewer users. In addition, lower-resolution
DACs cause higher quantization distortion with larger ρ, which leads to more severe user rate loss. As
φ increases, both RN and RR grow since more signal power is allocated to the users. By comparing
(19) and (20) with the same parameter values, it can be easily verified that RN > RR, as expected.
This is because random AN causes additional interference to the legitimate receivers while the more
complicated null-space based AN mitigates interference leakage to the users except for the leakage
due to the DAC quantization noise. Considering extremely low-resolution DACs with ρ → 1, we have
RR → RN and thus random AN achieves almost the same rate performance as the null-space based
AN. Under this condition, hardly any of the AN lies in the null-space of the user’s channel matrix after
DAC quantization and the performance of null-space based AN tends to that of random AN.
B. Ergodic Capacity of Eavesdropper
Without loss of generality, suppose that the data of user k is of interest to the eavesdropper. In
order to characterize the achievable secrecy rate, we assume the worst case that the eavesdropper
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has perfect knowledge of all the data channels and is able to cancel all inter-user interference before
attempting to decode the message of user k [16], [30], [31]. This assumption is reasonable because the
quantization noise dominates the rate performance compared to the multiuser interference, especially
for low-resolution DACs. Using (10) and under the assumption of large N and K, the ergodic capacity
of the eavesdropper can be evaluated as [52]
Ck = E
{
log2
(
1 + (1− ρ)pwHk HHe X−1Hewk
)}
, (21)
where X is defined as
X , (1− ρ)qHeVVHHHe +HeCDAHHe . (22)
Since analysis of the eavesdropper’s capacity in (21) appears less tractable, as an alternative, we derive
a tight upper bound for Ck, as given in the following theorem.
Theorem 1. For N →∞ and α+ β < 1, an upper bound for the ergodic capacity of the eavesdropper
is given by
C¯ , log2

1+ αβφ(1− φ+ ρ˜)(
1− α
1−β
)
(1−φ)2+2(1−α)(1−φ)ρ˜+(1−α)ρ˜2

, (23)
where ρ˜ , ρ
1−ρ
.
Proof. See Appendix B.
From Theorem 1, we have the following observations.
1) The expression for the eavesdropper’s capacity in (21) only exists if X in (22) is invertible.
When ρ → 0, we have X → qHeVVHHHe since CDA → 0 from (8). In this case, X is invertible
if N − K > M since the columns of the tall matrix, V, form an orthogonal basis for asymptotically
large N and the elements of He are i.i.d. complex Gaussian distributed. Similarly for ρ → 1, X →
He
[
p diag(WWH) + q diag(VVH)
]
HHe is invertible if N > M . Combining the above two conditions,
we see that X is invertible when N − K > M regardless of the value of ρ ∈ (0, 1). This results in
the same constraint, i.e., α + β < 1, as in Theorem 1, and is a common condition for massive MIMO
systems with a large N .
2) From (23), it is obvious that C¯ is monotonically increasing with α. This implies that the BS
12
can reduce the amount of private information leaked to the eavesdropper by deploying more transmit
antennas, while the eavesdropper can improve its wiretapping capability by employing more receive
antennas.
3) Given α, ρ, and φ, the effect of β on C¯ is generally not monotonic. By characterizing the derivative
of C¯ with respect to (w.r.t.) β, we find that C¯ decreases for β ∈ (0, β¯), while it increases when
β ∈ (β¯, 1− α), where
β¯ , 1−
√
α(1− φ)2
(1− α) [(1− φ) + ρ˜]2 + α(1− φ)2 . (24)
This can be explained as follows. When β is small, the transmit power allocated to each user decreases
significantly with increasing β and thus the eavesdropper’s capacity decreases accordingly. As β contin-
ues increasing, the impact of the reduced power per user becomes less significant. When β approaches
1−α, X becomes ill-conditioned and the eavesdropper’s capacity improves. In addition, it is noted that
β¯ can be larger than 1−α for large values of ρ and φ. Under this condition, C¯ decreases monotonically
for β ∈ (0, 1− α).
4) The parameter ρ˜ ∈ (0,∞) represents the influence of the low-resolution DACs on the capacity of
the eavesdropper. By characterizing the derivative of C¯ w.r.t. ρ˜, we find that ∂C¯
∂ρ˜
< 0, ∀ρ˜. It implies
that C¯ decreases with ρ˜, and hence with ρ. Since ρ increases with decreasing DAC resolution bDA, a
smaller bDA leads to a lower C¯ due to the increasing power of the quantization noise. This implies that
the utilization of low-resolution DACs makes some contribution to protecting the legitimate users from
eavesdropping, although it concurrently decreases the achievable user rate.
5) It is found that C¯ increases with φ, i.e., ∂C¯
∂φ
> 0, as the eavesdropper’s capacity increases with
decreasing AN power. Assuming that there is no AN, i.e., φ = 1, C¯ in (23) achieves the maximum
which is given by
C¯ = log2
[
1 +
α
(1− α)βρ˜
]
. (25)
Note that C¯ does not grow without an upper bound even if AN is not present due to the low-resolution
DAC quantization. To a certain extent, the quantization noise acts as a type of AN which helps to
degrade the eavesdropper’s capacity by producing unavoidable interference. In this case, C¯ becomes a
monotonically decreasing function w.r.t. β ∈ (0, 1 − α) because β¯ = 1 > 1 − α by substituting φ = 1
into (24).
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C. Lower Bound for the Achievable Secrecy Rate
Applying Lemma 1 and using (19), (20), and (23), a lower bound for the achievable secrecy rate of
each user is obtained as follows
RΨsec =
[
RΨ − C¯]+ , (26)
where Ψ ∈ {N ,R}. Using the results derived above, expressions for RNsec and RRsec are respectively
obtained as
RNsec =

log2

1 + (1− ρ)
(
1
β
− 1
)
φγ0
ργ0 + 1

− log2

1 + αφ
(
1
β
− 1
)
µ
(ν + αβ)µ2 − ζ




+
, (27)
and
RRsec =

log2

1 + (1− ρ)
(
1
β
− 1
)
φγ0
ργ0 + (1− ρ)(1− φ)γ0 + 1

− log2

1 + αφ
(
1
β
− 1
)
µ
(ν + αβ)µ2 − ζ




+
, (28)
where we define ν , 1 − α − β, µ , 1 − φ + ρ˜, and ζ = αβ(1− φ)2 for notational simplicity. These
closed-form expressions allow us to gain insight into the impact of the various system parameters, as
detailed in the next sections.
IV. SECRECY RATE ANALYSIS
In this section, we analyze the impact of various parameters, including α, β, ρ, and φ, on the secrecy
rate in massive MIMO systems using low-resolution DACs.
A. Impact of Antenna and User Loading Ratios
We first analyze the impact of the antenna ratio α defined in (11). In (26), C¯ increases monotonically
with α as indicated before while RΨ is independent of α. As a consequence, RΨsec is monotonically
decreasing w.r.t. α. Thus, a threshold value, α¯, may exist such that no positive secrecy rate can be
achieved when α > α¯, regardless of the values of other parameters. In other words, secure transmission
cannot be achieved if the eavesdropper possesses enough antennas.
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Since AN is injected to enhance the secrecy rate, we consider the special case that almost all the
power is allocated to generate AN, i.e., φ→ 0. By setting RΨsec = 0 in (27) and (28), α¯ is obtained as
α¯N =
(1− β)γ0
(ρ+ 1)γ0 + 1− βγ0ρ(2− ρ) (29)
and
α¯R =
(1− β)γ0
2γ0 + 1− βγ0ρ(2− ρ) . (30)
Since ρ ∈ (0, 1), we have α¯N > α¯R, which implies that the null-space based AN can tolerate a larger
number of eavesdropper antennas than the random AN at the expense of higher computational complexity
and the need for CSI. Interestingly, it can be observed that α¯N → α¯R when ρ → 1. This is because
the null-space based AN tends to be randomly distributed in the signal space after low-resolution DAC
quantization. Note that both α¯N and α¯R decrease with β. Next, we focus on the extreme condition when
β reduces to near 0:
lim
β→0
α¯N =
γ0
(ρ+ 1)γ0 + 1
(31)
and
lim
β→0
α¯R =
γ0
2γ0 + 1
. (32)
Under this circumstance, lim
β→0
α¯R is independent of ρ because the DAC quantization does not statistically
change the randomness of the random AN. By increasing γ0, both lim
β→0
α¯N and lim
β→0
α¯R grow accordingly,
thus improving the robustness for both AN design methods. In all cases, however, the two thresholds
are ultimately bounded above by lim
β→0
α¯N < 1
ρ+1
and lim
β→0
α¯R < 1
2
, respectively.
One can also study the impact of user loading ratio β defined in (12). We take the derivative of RΨsec
w.r.t. β and obtain that
∂RΨ
sec
∂β
< 0. Hence, by combining the observations from (23), it is reasonable to
expect that the secrecy rate will be enhanced with a smaller β. Furthermore, adding more antennas at
the BS can offer a larger beamforming gain, or alternatively, a smaller number of users leads to higher
per-user transmit power.
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B. Impact of DAC Distortion Parameter
Since both RΨ and C¯ decrease with increasing ρ due to the low-resolution DAC quantization, the
impact of ρ on the secrecy rate, RΨsec, is unclear. According to (26) and assuming a positive secrecy rate,
we have
∂RΨsec
∂ρ
=
∂RΨ
∂ρ
− ∂C¯
∂ρ
. (33)
On one hand, ∂C¯
∂ρ
< 0 is independent of γ0 since we assume a near-zero thermal noise power at the
eavesdropper. On the other hand, ∂R
Ψ
∂ρ
< 0 and decreases with large γ0 because the quantization noise
dominates the thermal noise at high SNRs. Thus, we conclude that there exists a γ¯Ψ0 ∈ (0,∞) which
guarantees that
∂RΨ
sec
∂ρ
> 0 for γ0 ∈ (0, γ¯Ψ0 ) and ∂R
Ψ
sec
∂ρ
< 0 for γ0 ∈ (γ¯Ψ0 ,∞). Interestingly, lower-resolution
DACs can achieve higher secrecy rate at low SNR, because the eavesdropper’s capacity C¯ decreases
faster than RΨ does with an increasing ρ. On the other hand, at high SNR, higher-resolution DACs are
advantageous compared to those with lower-resolution.
For the null-space AN method, the expression for
∂RΨ
sec
∂ρ
is given below:
∂RNsec
∂ρ
=−
(
1
β
− 1
)
φ(γ0 + 1)γ0
ln 2 (ργ0+1)
[
ργ0 + (1− ρ)
(
1
β
− 1
)
φγ0 + 1
]
+
αφ
(
1
β
− 1
)
[(ν + αβ)µ2 + ζ ]
ln 2(1−ρ)2[(ν+αβ)µ2−ζ ]
[
(ν+αβ)µ2−ζ + αφ
(
1
β
−1
)
µ
] (34)
,
1
ln 2
aNγ20 + b
N γ0 + c
N
dN
, (35)
where (34) utilizes ∂µ
∂ρ
= ∂ρ˜
∂ρ
= 1
(1−ρ)2
. Obviously, the sign of
∂RN
sec
∂ρ
depends on the values of the parameters
α, β, ρ, and φ. We have focused on the impact of γ0 and regard the derivative as a quadratic equation
w.r.t γ0 as in (35). In general, we have that d
N > 0, aN < 0, and cN > 0. This implies that a solution
for γ¯N0 exists by forcing (35) to zero. Solving the quadratic yields
γ¯N0 =
−bN −
√
bN
2 − 4aN cN
2aN
. (36)
If γ0 < γ¯
N
0 , lower-resolution DACs can be used to enhance the secrecy rate since quantization noise
degrades the eavesdropper’s capacity more pronouncedly than the user rate. While for γ0 > γ¯
N
0 , the
infinite-resolution DACs achieve the best performance. Since the expressions for aN , bN , cN , and dN
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are generally complicated, we consider a special case with ρ → 0, which means that ideal DACs with
infinite resolution are assumed. Under this condition, the related parameters are obtained as
aN = −ν(1 − φ)φ
[
ν(1− φ) + αφ
(
1
β
− 1
)]
, (37)
bN = 2α2φ2(1−β) + αφ3ν
(
1
β
−1
)
−ν2(1−φ)2φ, (38)
cN = αφ(ν + 2αβ), (39)
dN =ln 2 ν(1−φ)
[
ν(1−φ)β
1− β +αφ
][(
1
β
−1
)
φγ0+1
]
. (40)
By substituting (37)-(40) into (36), the threshold γ¯N0 for ρ → 0 is obtained. Although the threshold
relies on ρ in general, the obtained γ¯N0 can approximately be applied to all values of ρ ∈ (0, 1), which
is verified by the simulation results in Section V.
For the random AN design method, similar manipulations can be conducted and the threshold SNR
γ¯R0 is obtained as follows
γ¯R0 =
−bR −
√
bR
2 − 4aRcR
2aR
, (41)
where
aR =−ν(1− φ)φ
[
ν(1 − φ) + αφ
(
1
β
− 1
)]
+αφ(1−φ)(ν + 2αβ)
[(
1
β
−1
)
φ+1−φ
]
, (42)
bR =2α2φ2(1− β) + αφ3ν
(
1
β
− 1
)
− ν2(1− φ)2φ+ 2αφ(1− φ)(ν + 2αβ), (43)
cR = αφ(ν + 2αβ), (44)
dR = ln 2ν(1−φ)
[
ν(1− φ)β
1− β + αφ
]
[(1− φ)γ0+1]
[(
1
β
− 1
)
φγ0 + (1− φ)γ0 + 1
]
. (45)
Similarly, aR, bR, cR, and dR are obtained under the assumption of ρ → 0 and γ¯R0 is also insensitive
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to the value of ρ.
C. Impact of the Power Allocation Factor
The above analysis was conducted assuming a fixed φ. Now, we investigate the effect of this power
allocation factor on the secrecy rate. Since ∂R
Ψ
∂φ
> 0 and ∂C¯
∂φ
> 0 as indicated above, the sign of
∂RΨ
sec
∂φ
= ∂R
Ψ
∂φ
− ∂C¯
∂φ
cannot be immediately determined.
Take the secrecy rate in (27) with the null-space AN for instance. The derivative of RNsec w.r.t. φ is
calculated as
∂RNsec
∂φ
=
(1− ρ)( 1
β
− 1)γ0
ln 2
[
ργ0+1+(1−ρ)( 1β−1)γ0φ
]−α
(
1
β
−1
)[
(ν+αβ)µ2
1−ρ
−2αβµφ(1−φ)−αβ(1−φ)2(µ−φ)
]
ln 2 [(ν+αβ)µ2−ζ ]
[
(ν+αβ)µ2−ζ + αφ
(
1
β
−1
)
µ
] , (46)
where we use the fact that ∂µ
∂φ
= −1. For small φ we have ∂RNsec
∂φ
> 0 while for large φ we have
∂RN
sec
∂φ
< 0.
Thus, there exists an optimal φ, i.e., φ∗, that achieves the highest secrecy rate. By forcing
∂RN
sec
∂φ
= 0,
the optimal φ∗ is directly obtained. Since the expression in (46) is generally intractable, we resort to
the numerical bisection method to determine φ∗. In addition, we derive a closed-form expression for an
approximate φ∗ in the following. We assume that αβ ≪ 1, which generally holds in massive MIMO
networks with large antenna arrays at the BS. Then,
∂RN
sec
∂φ
in (46) approximately becomes
∂RNsec
∂φ
=
(1− ρ)( 1
β
− 1)γ0
ln 2
[
ργ0 + 1 + (1− ρ)( 1β − 1)γ0φ
] − α
(
1
β
−1
)
νµ2
1−ρ
ln 2 νµ2
[
νµ2 + αφ
(
1
β
−1
)
µ
] . (47)
Setting
∂RN
sec
∂φ
= 0, the optimal φ∗ is obtained as
φN∗ =
ν −
√
ν2 +
(
αρ+ α
γ0
− ν
)(
1− β − α
β
)
(1− ρ)
(
1− β − α
β
) . (48)
For random AN, a similar analysis can be conducted. Under the same assumption αβ ≪ 1, the optimal
φR∗ is given by
φR∗ =
(1+γ0)(ν − α)−
√
α(1+γ0)
[(
1
β
+1
)
(ν−α)+ 1
γ0
(
1−β− α
β
)]
(1− ρ)
[
1− β − α
β
+ γ0(ν − α)
] . (49)
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Fig. 2. Eavesdropper’s capacity and the corresponding upper bounds versus β (N = 100, M = 7, and φ = 0.7).
Due to the constraint that φ ∈ (0, 1], we set φ∗ = 1 if the obtained φ∗ in (48) and (49) is larger than
1. Under this condition, the secrecy rate increases monotonically with φ ∈ (0, 1]. In Section V, we will
show that both φN∗ in (48) and φR∗ in (49) are accurate for various combinations of system parameters.
V. SIMULATION RESULTS
In this section, we verify the tightness of the derived bounds and the obtained insights via numerical
simulation. We use the typical values for the distortion parameter ρ in [53] for each DAC using bDA
bits for quantization. For perfect DACs with bDA →∞, we set ρ→ 0.
A. Ergodic Capacity of Eavesdropper
We first study the tightness of the derived upper bound for the eavesdropper’s capacity. Fig. 2 compares
the eavesdropper’s capacity in (21) and the upper bound in (23), for DAC resolutions bDA = 1, 2, and
∞. In general, our derived upper bound is tight for β ranging from 0.1 to 0.9. Clearly, the low-resolution
DACs result in a capacity loss due to the interference caused by the quantization noise. As accurately
predicted by our analysis in (24), the eavesdropper achieves the lowest capacity for β¯ = 0.7354 and
β¯ = 0.8133 with bDA = ∞ and bDA = 2, respectively. These two points are denoted by markers × in
the figure. For bDA = 1, we have β¯ = 0.9059 according to (24) and thus C¯ decreases monotonically for
β ∈ (0.1, 0.9).
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Fig. 3. Eavesdropper’s capacity and our derived upper bound versus power allocation factor φ (N = 100, K = 10, and M = 5).
Fig. 3 shows the capacity of the eavesdropper for φ ranging from 0 to 1. Obviously, C¯ increases
monotonically with φ. The lower the AN power, the higher the eavesdropper’s capacity will be due to
the power reduction in the interference. In addition, we see that low-resolution DACs help to degrade
the channel quality of the eavesdropper regardless of the value of φ. Assuming the eavesdropper is able
to perfectly cancel the inter-user interference and the thermal noise is negligibly small, the capacity
approaches infinity with φ → 1 and bDA = ∞ since there is no remaining interference. Thus, AN is
necessary for conventional secure communication when perfect DACs are available. However, this is not
the case for low-resolution DACs since the quantization noise can protect the confidential information
from eavesdropping. Under the assumption of φ → 1, the capacity converges to 2.2985 and 0.9407,
instead of infinity, for bDA = 2 and bDA = 1, respectively.
B. Achievable Ergodic Secrecy Rate
In the following, we verify the accuracy of the derived lower bound for the achievable secrecy rate.
Fig. 4 shows the ergodic secrecy rate and its lower bound in (27) with the null-space AN method. The
dotted markers correspond to the simulation results while the solid lines correspond to the lower bound.
We observe that the derived bound is tight for γ0 ranging from 0 dB to 20 dB. With infinite-resolution
DACs, the secrecy rate increases proportionally with γ0 while the low-resolution DAC quantization
causes significant rate loss at high SNR. From (36), the SNR threshold is computed as γ¯N0 = 5.6838 dB
with ρ → 0, i.e., bDA → ∞. When γ0 < γ¯N0 , lower-resolution DACs can provide higher secrecy rate
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Fig. 4. Ergodic secrecy rate and lower bound versus SNR with null-space AN (N = 128, K = 8, M = 16, and φ = 0.8).
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Fig. 5. Ergodic secrecy rate and lower bound versus SNR with random AN (N = 128, K = 8, M = 6, and φ = 0.7).
since the achievable rate of each user decreases more slowly than the eavesdropper’s capacity as the
DAC resolution decreases. At low SNR, thermal noise dominates at the users and the DAC quantization
affects the eavesdropper’s capacity more pronouncedly. On the other hand, when γ0 > γ¯
N
0 , infinite-
resolution DACs achieve the highest secrecy rate. In addition, we observe that the obtained γ¯N0 can also
be applied to low-resolution DACs with bDA = 3 and bDA = 2 as indicated before, although technically
γ¯N0 depends on the quantization distortion parameter ρ. This makes the DAC resolution allocation much
simpler and appealing in practice since only one γ¯N0 needs to be calculated.
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Fig. 5 illustrates the ergodic secrecy rate and the derived lower bound in (28) with random AN. The
secrecy rate increases with SNR but saturates eventually at high SNR, even if infinite-resolution DACs
are adopted. This is because the random AN degrades the achievable rate of the legitimate users while the
null-space AN only causes interference to the eavesdropper. From (41), γ¯R0 is calculated as 6.1303 dB.
In order to enhance the secrecy rate, increasing the DAC resolution is recommended if γ0 > 6.1303 dB
but not if γ0 ≤ 6.1303 dB. In both Fig. 4 and Fig. 5, a fixed φ is assumed since it is in general difficult
to optimize φ analytically. In order to alleviate the performance degradation of fixed power allocation,
we present an approximate φ∗ in (48) and (49) for the null-space AN and the random AN methods,
respectively. Corresponding simulations are illustrated in Fig. 8 and Fig. 10 in the next subsection.
Fig. 6 depicts α¯ in (29) and (30) for null-space and random AN, respectively. As indicated in
Section IV.A, a positive secrecy rate can be achieved only if α < α¯. It is observed from Fig. 6 that α¯
decreases monotonically with β. Given a fixed N , the transmit power of each user decreases with an
increasing number of usersK, i.e., increasing β, and thus fewer antennas are required at the eavesdropper
to decode the information. Note that even with β → 0, a threshold α¯ < 1 exists, which implies that
the eavesdropper is still able to successfully wiretap as long as it employs enough antennas. Comparing
null-space and random AN, we find that α¯N > α¯R for γ0 = 10 dB. This implies that higher hardware
cost is required at the eavesdropper to resist null-space AN than random AN.
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Fig. 7. Ergodic secrecy rate versus φ with null-space AN (N = 128, K = 8, and M = 16).
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Fig. 8. Ergodic secrecy rate with the optimal φ∗ versus SNR for null-space AN method (N = 128, K = 8, and M = 16).
C. Optimal Power Allocation
In the following, the accuracy of the obtained closed-form expressions for the approximately optimal
φ are verified. For null-space AN, Fig. 7 shows the ergodic secrecy rate with φ ranging from 0 to 1. We
consider 1-3 bit DACs compared with the infinite-resolution case. Interestingly, the infinite-resolution
DACs achieve the highest secrecy rate when φ is small while the lower-resolution DACs provide better
rate performance for large φ. On one hand, a high DAC resolution is needed when most of the transmit
power is allocated to generate AN. On the other hand, lower-resolution DACs can achieve higher secrecy
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Fig. 9. Ergodic secrecy rate versus φ with random AN (N = 128, K = 8, and M = 16).
rates when most of the power is used to transmit information signals. In fact, DAC quantization noise
serves as a kind of AN to improve communication security. The markers × in the figure denote the
optimal φ∗ obtained by numerical methods while the circles represent the φN∗ in (48). We can see that
the two match exactly. Specifically when γ0 = 0 dB, we have φ
N∗ = 0.5117, 0.3841, 0.3552, 0.3452 for
bDA = 1, 2, 3,∞, respectively. For γ0 = 5 dB, φN∗ = 0.5687, 0.4247, 0.3926, 0.3808 for bDA = 1, 2, 3,∞,
respectively. For the same value of γ0, the optimal φ
∗ increases with decreasing DAC resolution.
This implies that more power should be allocated to the transmit signals with lower-resolution DACs.
Furthermore, Fig. 8 shows the secrecy rate with the optimal φ∗. Comparing Fig. 4 with a fixed φ = 0.8,
we see that low-resolution DACs inevitably degrade the secrecy rate regardless of the SNR. If the optimal
φ∗ is achievable, higher-resolution DACs always provide more secure transmission.
For random AN, Fig. 9 shows the achievable secrecy rate versus φ using low-resolution DACs. The
optimal φ∗ obtained by numerical methods is denoted by × while the derived φR∗ in (49) is denoted by
circles. For the case that γ0 = 0 dB, we have φ
R∗ = 0.6103, 0.4402, 0.4024, 0.3885 while for γ0 = 5 dB,
we have φR∗ = 0.8243, 0.5960, 0.5435, 0.5247, for bDA = 1, 2, 3,∞, respectively. Unlike the results of the
null-space AN method shown in Fig. 7, the highest secrecy rates with the optimal φ∗ are approximately
equal for bDA = 1, 2, 3, and ∞, i.e., RRsec = 1.6346 and 0.9113 for γ0 = 5 and 0 dB, respectively.
For various DAC resolutions, the same peak secrecy rate can be achieved as long as the optimal φ∗
is used. In other words, the impact of low-resolution DACs on secure transmission is insignificant.
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Fig. 10. Ergodic secrecy rate with the optimal φ∗ versus SNR for random AN method (N = 128, K = 8, and M = 12).
This is because the DAC quantization noise acts as random AN at both the users and eavesdropper.
Although the quantization noise increases with a lower bDA, the same maximum secrecy rate can still
be achieved by increasing φ to reduce the AN power. Compare Fig. 7 and Fig. 9 and take γ0 = 0 dB for
instance. When infinite-resolution DACs are deployed and using the optimal φ∗, the highest secrecy rate
is RNsec = 1.4788 with null-space AN, which is much larger than R
R
sec = 0.9113 with random AN. When
1-bit DACs are considered, we have RNsec = 1.1217, which is closer to R
R
sec = 0.9113. This implies that
random AN becomes cost-efficient when low-resolution DACs are adopted. The advantage of null-space
AN is marginal in this case. The achievable secrecy rates are displayed in Fig. 10 when the optimal φ∗
is used. As observed from Fig. 9, the secrecy rates are generally not degraded by low-resolution DACs,
except at high SNR with bDA = 1. Hence, using DAC resolutions beyond 1 bit is not beneficial in terms
of secrecy rate. This implies that low-resolution DACs can provide almost the same secure performance
as infinite resolution DACs with random AN. For the scenario in Fig. 10 where 1-bit DACs are employed
and γ0 > 9.8 dB, the secrecy rate increases monotonically with φ ∈ (0, 1] and therefore φ∗ = 1, which
is different from the cases with low SNR shown in Fig. 9. Under this condition, at least a two-bit DAC
is needed at the BS to achieve the same secrecy rate as that in the infinite resolution case.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we investigate the physical layer security of a multiuser massive MIMO system em-
ploying low-resolution DACs at the transmitter, in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. A tight lower
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bound for the achievable secrecy rate of each user is derived. We find that the DAC quantization noise can
be regarded as additional AN provided by the BS and may contribute to the secure transmission. Given
a fixed power allocation factor φ, low-resolution DACs can achieve superior secrecy performance under
certain conditions, e.g., at low SNR or with large φ. If the optimal φ∗ can be obtained, low-resolution
DACs inevitably lead to secrecy rate loss with the null-space AN design method. On the other hand,
for random AN, low-resolution DACs achieve the same secrecy performance as high-resolution DACs
at low SNR and thus the former are cost-efficient in this scenario. Note that our derived results directly
apply for the system with multi-antenna users if multiple data streams are transmitted to each user.
This is because in massive MIMO, an L-antenna user can be equivalently regarded as L single-antenna
users, due to the asymptotic orthogonality among channel vectors. However, the extension becomes more
complicated if a single data stream is transmitted. Interesting future work includes further extending our
current results to such a general secnario with multi-antenna users.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 2
In order to obtain the asymptotic expression for γk, we derive Sk, Ik, Qk, and Ak in (15) one by one.
Consider a typical ZF-precoder under the constraint that tr{WWH} = K, i.e.,
W =
√
K
tr{(HHH)−1}H
H(HHH)−1. (50)
It is well known that HHH ∼ Wk(N, Ik), where Wm(n,Σ) denotes an m×m Wishart matrix with n
degrees of freedom and Σ is the covariance matrix of each column. Assuming that K and N grow to
infinity with a fixed ratio β = K
N
, we have [54]
tr{(HHH)−1} a.s.−−→ β
1− β . (51)
Substituting (51) in (50) yields
HW
a.s.−−→
√
K
(
1
β
− 1
)
Ik. (52)
Thus, Sk and Ik converge to
Sk
a.s.−−→ (1− ρ)φP
(
1
β
− 1
)
(53)
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and
Ik
a.s.−−→ 0, (54)
respectively.
As for Qk, the emphasis lies on the asymptotic characterizations of CDA in (8). For large N and K,
CDA converges to a scaled identity matrix as follows
CDA
a.s.−−→ ρP
N
IN , (55)
where we use (5), (6), and the fact that
diag(WWH)
a.s.−−→ K
N
IN (56)
and
diag(VVH)
a.s.−−→ N −K
N
IN , (57)
due to the strong law of large numbers. Then, by substituting (55) into (15), we have
Qk
a.s.−−→ρP
N
hTkh
∗
k = ρP. (58)
Finally for Ak, the result depends on the AN shaping matrix V. For the null-space AN method with
HV = 0, it is obvious that
ANk = 0. (59)
For the random AN method, ARk in (15) can be regarded as a matrix comprised of one single element,
i.e., ARk ∼ W1(N −K, (1− ρ)q), and it follows that
ARk = tr
{
ARk
}
= (N −K)(1− ρ)q (60)
= (1− ρ)(1− φ)P, (61)
where (60) comes from the fact that tr{A} = mn for a Wishart matrix A ∼ Wm(n, Im) [54], and (61)
uses (6).
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Now, by substituting (53), (54), (58), (59), and (61) into (15), the asymptotic SIQNRs for the null-
space and random AN methods are respectively obtained in (17) and (18).
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF THEOREM 1
To begin with, we demonstrate that X defined in (22) can be approximated as a scaled Wishart matrix.
Substituting (55) into (22) yields
X
a.s.−−→ (1− ρ)qHeVVHHHe + ρ
P
N
HeH
H
e
= (1− ρ)qHeVVHHHe + ρ
P
N
He[V V0][V V0]
HHHe (62)
=
[
(1− ρ)q + ρP
N
]
H1H
H
1︸ ︷︷ ︸
W1
+ρ
P
N
H2H
H
2︸ ︷︷ ︸
W2
, (63)
where (62) uses the fact that [V V0][V V0]
H = IM since [V V0] is a complete orthogonal basis
with dimension N , and (63) utilizes the definitions H1 , HeV and H2 , HeV0. From (63), X is
statistically equivalent to a weighted sum of two scaled Wishart matrices, i.e., X1 ∼ WM(N −K, IM)
and X2 ∼ WM (K, IM). Strictly speaking, X is not a Wishart matrix and the exact distribution of X
is intractable. However, X may be accurately approximated as a single scaled Wishart matrix, X ∼
WM(η, λIM), where the parameters η and λ are chosen such that the first two moments of X and[
(1− ρ)q + ρ P
N
]
W1 + ρ
P
N
W2 are identical [30], which yields
ηλ = (N −K)
[
(1− ρ)q + ρP
N
]
+Kρ
P
N
(64)
and
ηλ2 = (N −K)
[
(1− ρ)q + ρP
N
]2
+K
(
ρ
P
N
)2
. (65)
Substituting (6) into (64) and (65), η and λ are obtained as
η = N
[(1− ρ)(1− φ) + ρ]2
[(1− ρ)(1− φ) + ρ]2 + (1− ρ)2(1− φ)2 K
N−K
(66)
and
λ =
P
N
[(1− ρ)(1− φ) + ρ]2 + (1− ρ)2(1− φ)2 K
N−K
(1− ρ)(1− φ) + ρ , (67)
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respectively.
Next, we apply Jensen’s inequality which yields an upper bound for the eavesdropper’s capacity:
Ck ≤ log2
[
1 + (1− ρ)p E{wHk HHe X−1Hewk}]
= log2
[
1 +
(1− ρ)p
λ(η −M) E
{
wHk H
H
e Hewk
}]
(68)
= log2
[
1 +
(1− ρ)pM
λ(η −M) E
{
wHk wk
}]
(69)
= log2
[
1 +
(1− ρ)pM
λ(η −M)
]
, (70)
where (68) utilizes the property that A−1
a.s.−−→ 1
n−m
Im for a Wishart matrix A ∼ Wm(n, Im) with
n > m [39], (69) uses the fact that 1
M
HHe He − IN a.s.−−→ 0N due to the Central Limit Theorem, and
(70) applies the weak law of large numbers and E{wHk wk} = 1K
K∑
k=1
wHk wk =
1
K
tr{WHW} = 1. Note
that the derivation in (68) only holds for an invertible X ∼ WM(η, λIM), which yields η −M > 0. By
substituting (11), (12), and (66), we have
η −M
=N
(1−α)(1−β)[(1− ρ)(1− φ) + ρ]2−αβ(−ρ)2(1−φ)2
(1− β)[(1− ρ)(1− φ) + ρ]2 + β(1− ρ)2(1− φ)2
=N
(1− α)(1− β)(1− ρ)2(1− φ)2
(1− β)[(1− ρ)(1− φ) + ρ]2 + β(1− ρ)2(1− φ)2
[(
1+
ρ
(1−ρ)(1−φ)
)2
− αβ
(1−α)(1−β)
]
>0. (71)
Regardless of the values of ρ ∈ (0, 1) and φ ∈ (0, 1], (71) holds if αβ
(1−α)(1−β)
< 1, which yields α+β < 1
with β ∈ (0, 1) and α ∈ (0, 1). Fortunately, this is a common condition for massive MIMO systems
with large N .
Finally by substituting (5), (66), and (67) into (70), the upper bound in (23) is directly obtained.
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